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ABSTRACT 
Brothers in Arms – An Experiment on the Alliance Puzzle    
by Changxia Ke, Kai A. Konrad and Florian Morath * 
Our experimental analysis of alliances in conflicts leads to three main findings. 
First, even in the absence of repeated interaction, direct contact or 
communication, free-riding among alliance members is far less pronounced 
than what would be expected from non-cooperative theory. Second, this 
possible solidarity among `brothers in arms' when fighting against an outside 
enemy may rapidly deteriorate or disappear as soon as the outside enemy 
disappears. Third, when fighting an outside enemy, `brothers in arms' may 
already anticipate future internal conflict about dividing the spoils of winning; 
however, this subsequent internal conflict does not discourage alliance 
members from expending much effort in the contest against the external enemy. 
 
Keywords: Alliance, conflict, contest, free-riding, hold-up problem, solidarity 
 
JEL classification: D72, D74 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Brothers in Arms – An Experiment on the Alliance Puzzle  
Unsere experimentelle Studie zu Allianzen in Konflikten führt zu drei 
Hauptergebnissen. Selbst ohne wiederholte Interaktion, direkten Kontakt oder 
Kommunikation zwischen den Teilnehmern ist das „Trittbrettfahren“ der 
Mitglieder der Allianz viel weniger stark ausgeprägt, als es die nicht-kooperative 
Theorie erwarten lassen würde. Diese Solidarität zwischen den „Kampf-
gefährten“, die im Wettbewerb mit einem Außenstehenden zu beobachten ist, 
nimmt jedoch rapide ab, sobald der Gegner verschwunden ist. Im Kampf mit 
dem externen Gegner können die „Kampfgefährten“ bereits damit rechnen, 
dass es zu einem internen Konflikt über die Aufteilung der Kriegsbeute kommen 
wird; dieser folgende interne Verteilungskonflikt hält die Mitglieder der Allianz 
jedoch nicht davon ab, einen hohen Einsatz im Kampf mit dem externen 
Gegner zu leisten.    
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support from the German Research Foundation (DFG, grant no. SFB-TR-15) is gratefully 
acknowledged.  
 
 
1 Introduction
The formation of an alliance is typically embraced as a signal of political
success. Psychologists o¤er explanations for this positive attitude towards
alliances in conicts. Baumeister and Leary (1995, p.499), for instance, ar-
gue that there is a severe competitive disadvantage of the lone individual
confronting a groupand that, when other people are in groups, it is vital to
belong to a group oneself. Other researchers emphasized the importance of
group spirit. Campbell (1965, p.293), for instance, considers the willingness
to risk death for group causesas one of the things which makes lethal war
possible. Work on alliances by Sherif et al. (1961) reveals the importance
of the rival, or out-group, for the emergence of in-group solidarity and out-
group hostility. Cohesion among brothers in arms is possibly generated by
the common enemy or threator possibly by behavioral norms.1
In contrast, narrow rational choice reasoning hints at two major disad-
vantages for the members of an alliance. First, in the competition between
the alliance and its adversaries, the members of the alliance face a free-
rider problem as their contributions to the ghting e¤ort in the inter-alliance
competition are to some extent contributions to a public good (Olson and
Zeckhauser 1966).2 The members of an alliance - the brothers in arms -
all benet from a higher collective ghting e¤ort. But each member should
prefer the additional e¤ort to be expended by other members of his group.
The members of an alliance face a second major strategic problem. If the
alliance is victorious, they may quarrel about dividing the spoils of victory.
The e¤ort expended in this internal distributional conict reduces the value
they attribute to this prize. This future e¤ort should further discourage
1See, e.g., Wilkins (2006) for a discussion of the realistand the pluralisttheory in
the context of the Normandy Campaign 1944.
2See, e.g., Baik, Kim and Na (2001), Baik, Hwan, and Lee (1998), Davis and Reilly
(1999), Esteban and Ray (2001), Katz, Nitzan and Rosenberg (1990), Lee (1995), Nitzan
(1991a), Nitzan (1991b), Nitzan (1994), Nitzan and Ueda (2008), Rapoport and Amaldoss
(1997), and Ursprung (1990).
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alliance members at the stage when they decide about their contribution of
e¤ort to the inter-alliance conict.3
Anecdotal evidence suggests that these psychological e¤ects as well as
rational choice considerations may be at work. Moreover, the formation and
resolution of alliances is a dynamic phenomenon, and each cause of conict
is full of idiosyncrasies. Empirically it is di¢ cult to distinguish these e¤ects
and measure their size. The experimental laboratory, with its controlled en-
vironment, allows us to separate the di¤erent e¤ects. International military
alliances have many complex features, which lead to further relevant ques-
tions, ranging from the process of forming and dissolving alliances to the
timing of alliance formation. These and many other aspects will, on pur-
pose, not play a role in the experimental framework, and what seemingly is
a weakness of the approach is in fact its main strength. Accounting for all
these issues blurs the picture and generally causes considerable data prob-
lems. In the experiment it is possible to remove the endogeneity problem
and to detach a single conict from the larger course of history, allowing us
to concentrate on the strategic aspects that remain in our more narrowly
dened framework.
We ask two main questions. First, we address the issue of contributing
e¤ort for the alliance. We ask: how important is the perspective that future
redistributional conict within a victorious alliance reduces the value of win-
ning? Does this possible future intra-alliance conict among the members
of a victorious alliance discourage its members from making e¤ort contribu-
tions in the conict between the alliance and its adversary, compared to a
situation in which this conict cannot emerge? Second, we address some of
the possible psychological e¤ects of in-group and between-group dynamics.
We ask: how does the alliance membersexperience of successfully ghting
shoulder-to-shoulder a¤ect their willingness to turn against each other when
3See Katz and Tokatlidu (1996), Esteban and Sákovics (2003), Müller and Wärneryd
(2001), Wärneryd (1998), Konrad (2004).
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they have to solve the distributional conict between them?
Our general framework consists of a contest between an alliance, con-
sisting of two players, and a single player. Alliance players and the single
player expend e¤orts trying to win a reward of a given size. If the single
player wins, he takes the reward and the game ends. If the alliance wins,
the alliance players need to share this reward. We consider two di¤erent
-exogenously imposed- sharing regimes. In one regime the alliance members
split evenly the gains from winning. In a second regime the alliance mem-
bers have to ght about how to distribute the gains from winning between
them. The comparison of these two regimes yields an answer to one of the
key questions: do brothers in arms behave di¤erently if they anticipate fu-
ture conict between them? Moreover, we compare the contest e¤orts among
members of the winning alliance if they ght internally about the division of
the reward with the e¤orts in a similar two-player contest among strangers.
In this way, we can answer the question of whether having jointly defeated
an enemy a¤ects behavior in the process of dividing the spoils.
Our results are only partially in line with the rational choice theory of
alliance formation, but we also do not nd strong evidence in support of
intra-group solidarity. Members of an alliance expend much more e¤ort in
the conict with outsiders than would be predicted by the classical theory of
contests. This high e¤ort is seemingly independent of whether the members
of a victorious alliance face a wasteful distributional conict within the group
or not. Moreover, we nd little evidence that the joint experience of ghting
side-by-side in an alliance against a joint enemy reduces the alliance members
mutual hostility when it comes to dividing the spoils of victory.
The di¤erent e¤ects which we isolate and quantify in the laboratory can
be illustrated by anecdotal evidence for wars. Free-riding, opportunism and
strategies of burden shifting among allies have been discussed.4 Many writers
4Starr (1972, p.28), for instance makes this point: "Indeed the Russians felt that the
Western Allies had conspired to foist the human cost of the war upon them, as reected
in the delay in the opening of a second front, and the resulting casualty gures of the Red
4
also emphasize a high potential for the break-up of the alliance when defeat
of the enemy is imminent. For the First World War, Bunselmeyer (1975,
p.15) claims:
The British also disagreed with the French over economic
policy. To be sure, the two Allies cooperated on economic matters
during most of the War, and they were the principal sponsors of
the Paris Economic Revolutions. However, their cooperation dis-
solved as victory became certain and reparation and indemnity
replaced other wartime planning. Thereafter, they became the
principal competitors for shares of compensation from Germany.
A similar observation has been made for the Napoleonic War (OConnor
1967, p.369). And the break-up of the Great Alliance right after the Second
World War and the beginning of the Cold War is perhaps the best and most
frequently cited example for former alliance members turning against each
other and ghting about the spoils of war. An important warning can be
found in the Records of the War Department General and Special Sta¤s,
Plans and Operations Division, Exec. 8. Col. J. McNarney and Rear Adm.
R.K. Turner, in the Joint Instructions for Army and Navy Representatives,
O¢ ce of the Chief of Sta¤, Washington DC, 21 January 1941, in prepara-
tion of the Allied conferences: "Never absent from British minds are their
postwar interests, commercial and military. We should likewise safeguard
our eventual interests."5 Taken together, historical evidence suggests that
victorious alliances may collapse after having achieved their primary goal,
and the former allies start ghting with each other about the spoils of war.
As Beilenson (1969, p.193) concludes: Among victors, alliances have ten-
ded to dissolve at the peace table in quarrels over the spoils.But how does
the anticipation of this future conict a¤ect their behavior during the war?
Army."
5Cited in: Wilkins (2006, p.1136).
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And how does the joint ghting experience a¤ect their ghting behavior after
the breakup of the alliance? These are the focal questions in our empirical
analysis.
There is no experimental work that we are aware of that addresses the
strategic e¤ects of future conict among current alliance members, nor on
the possible solidarity e¤ect of having previously been brothers in armsif
they have to ght about dividing the spoils. However, structurally related
questions have been addressed in the context of groups making contributions
to a group-specic public good. In particular, a small literature compares
contributions to a public good in inter-team conicts. These include Gun-
nthorsdottir and Rapoport (2006), Abbink et al. (2010), Ahn et al. (2010),
and Kugler et al. (2010). This last paper is framed as a public good game, but
structurally it analyses what is, in essence, an asymmetric contest between
an alliance and an adversary who is a single person. Sheremeta and Zhang
(2010) consider contests between teams and compare their e¤orts with e¤orts
in single-player contests. They allow for communication between members of
the same team. While single players and teams over-expend e¤ort compared
to the theory prediction, teams expend somewhat less e¤ort. These papers
cover the problem of free-riding, but they do not address a possible conict
within the victorious group and its consequences for the inter-alliance con-
ict. Also, the existing studies do not address our key question of whether
former brothers in armsght less violently with each other than strangers
do.
Another important line of experimental research considers contests more
generally. This very large body of literature cannot be surveyed here, but
few contributions in this literature consider multi-stage contests. Sheremeta
(2010) considers multi-stage elimination contests among single players. His
conclusion about the intrinsic value of winning as a motivational factor may
also be indicative for explaining some of our results. None of this literature
addresses the role of future conict among players at the stage in which
6
they are brothers in arms, nor whether their joint history moderates their
internal ghting.
2 Theoretical setup
Consider a contest among three players A, B, and C who compete for a
common prize of value V by expending e¤ort. Players A and B join their
forces and form an alliance AB to compete with player C. If player C wins,
he gets the prize. If the alliance AB wins, the prize value has to be shared
among players A and B. In this paper, we focus on two most common
sharing rules: the equal-sharing rule and the contest-sharing rule. If the
equal-sharing rule applies, each of the players A and B gets one half of the
prize value, independently of the e¤ort that players A and B expended in the
contest with player C. If the contest-sharing rule applies, players A and B
compete for the prize by again expending e¤ort in an intra-alliance contest
between them. The sharing rule is exogenously given and assumed to be
common knowledge to players A, B and C when they enter into the contest.
We consider the following contest success function for describing how
playerse¤orts translate into win probabilities. Let (xA; xB; xC) be the play-
erse¤orts in the contest between the alliance AB and C. Then, the prob-
ability that the alliance AB wins this contest is equal to
pAB =
(
xA+xB
xA+xB+xC
; for xA + xB + xC > 0
1
2
; for xA + xB + xC = 0
; (1)
and the probability that C wins is equal to the remaining probability pC =
1 pAB. This contest success function describes what is commonly known as
the Tullock lottery contest.6 Costs of e¤orts are equal to a player is e¤ort
6This function has been invented and used independently to describe contests in di¤er-
ent elds and also has received multiple axiomatic foundations. See, e.g., Konrad (2009,
pp. 42-53) for a detailed survey.
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xi; i 2 fA;B;Cg. Therefore, the expected monetary payo¤ of each player
-Ei- is given as:
Ei = pABvi   xi; if i 2 fA;Bg (2)
EC = pCvC   xC (3)
where vi is player is expected prize value if the alliance wins the inter-alliance
contest, for i 2 fA;Bg, which depends on the prize-sharing rule. If player C
wins, he gets the entire prize, thus vC = V .
Case 1: Equal sharing If players A and B simply split up the prize
equally in case they win against C (and they can commit to this sharing rule),
vA = vB = V=2. If the alliance players choose their e¤ort non-cooperatively
and each player maximizes his expected monetary payo¤ given in (2) and
(3), respectively, this results in equilibrium e¤orts
(xA + xB)
 =
V
9
and xC =
2V
9
: (4)
Here, due to the assumptions on the alliance playerse¤orts, only the sum
xA+xB is uniquely determined in equilibrium. The sum of e¤orts (xA + xB)

is smaller than player Cs equilibrium e¤ort xC : As the expected prize value
for each alliance player is lower than the prize value for the single player,
they do not expend more e¤ort than the single player. Moreover, due to the
free-rider problem, the alliance players even together expend less e¤ort than
the single player. Expected equilibrium payo¤s are
(EA + EB)
 =
2V
9
and (EC)
 =
4V
9
(5)
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where again only the sum of player A and Bs payo¤ is uniquely determined.
The alliances joint payo¤ is even smaller than the payo¤of the single player.7
Case 2: Internal ght If the alliance players cannot commit to sharing
the prize peacefully in case they win the contest, this can result in an internal
ght. This intra-alliance contest follows the same rules of the lottery contest.
If A and Bs e¤ort in this second contest is denoted by yA and yB, then As
probability of winning this intra-alliance contest is
qA =
(
yA
yA+yB
; for yA + yB > 0
1
2
; for yA + yB = 0
(6)
and Bs winning probability is qB = 1   qA. In case player i 2 fA;Bg wins
this second contest, he obtains the entire prize V . Both players, however,
have to pay their cost of e¤ort, which is equal to yi:
If the alliance AB wins the contest against C and players A and B ght
about the prize V , their expected payo¤s in this subgame are qiV   yi, and
the equilibrium e¤orts in this intra-alliance contest are therefore equal to
yA = y

B =
V
4
: (7)
Thus, they obtain an expected payo¤(net of e¤ort cost) in this second contest
equal to
qiV   yi = V
2
  V
4
=
V
4
for i 2 fA;Bg:
Hence, an alliance players expected prize value (net of e¤ort cost) from
winning against C is equal to V=4 (i.e., vA = vB = V=4) which is only half
of their expected prize value in Case 1 where they share the prize peacefully.
Consequently, the alliance playerse¤ort in the contest against C decreases.
7This holds qualitatively even if, for whatever reason, the players A and B could choose
their e¤orts cooperatively in the contest against player C, due to prize sharing.
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Equilibrium e¤orts in the contest between AB and C are
(xA + xB)
 =
V
25
and xC =
4V
25
; (8)
In total, expected payo¤s are equal to
(EA + EB)
 =
3V
50
and (EC)
 =
16V
25
: (9)
Here, the di¤erence between expected payo¤s of alliance players and the
single player becomes even larger: potential internal ght about the prize
identies a second important reason why forming an alliance in contests may
not be desirable.
3 The experiment
Our experiment is composed of four treatments that measure the e¤ect of
internal conict, on the one hand, and test for the importance of joint ghting
experience on the other hand. In the base Share treatment, two alliance
players (A and B) are teamed up exogenously and ght against player C for
a prize of 450. Players A, B and C independently choose their e¤orts xA;
xB and xC from the set f0; 1; 2; :::; 250g. Then, the three choices xA; xB and
xC within one group are displayed, and the lottery contest success function
given in (1) determines whether the alliance AB or the sole player C wins.
The probabilistic nature of the outcome of the lottery contest is illustrated
graphically by a dynamic fortune wheel.8 Having followed the outcome of the
fortune wheel, subjects were given their prots in this period. If the alliance
wins, each of the alliance members gets half of the prize. If the sole player
8It is a well-known problem that it is di¢ cult for the subjects to understand the prob-
abilities as they emerge from the contest success function. In the fortune wheel, the
e¤orts are translated into colored segments that correspond to the share of xA + xB and
xC , respectively, in total e¤ort xA + xB + xC . The segment in which the arrow stopped
determined whether the alliance AB or player C won the contest.
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wins, he/she receives the full prize.
The second treatment, called Share900, deviates from treatment Share in
only one respect: the prize that is handed out to the winner(s) is 900 instead
of 450. Consequently, the e¤ort choices are from the set f0; 1; 2; :::; 500g.
This treatment is mainly designed as an internal validity test, to see whether
the e¤ort choices would also double.
A third treatment, called Fight, is also identical to treatment Share, ex-
cept that the alliance players have to engage in an intra-alliance contest to
determine who gets the full prize if they win the contest against player C.
So, if the alliance of players A and B wins the prize against C, then the game
continues. Players A and B have to simultaneously choose their intra-alliance
contest e¤orts yA and yB. Again, after choices have been made, these e¤orts
yA and yB are shown on the screen, and another fortune wheel determines
the winner between the two. The winner in the lottery contest between A
and B receives the full prize. A comparison of treatments Share and Fight
will shed light on how e¤ort choice of alliance players in inter-alliance contest
is inuenced by the intra-alliance prize sharing rule.
The fourth treatment FightNH (no history) is conducted to elaborate
on whether former brothers in armsght di¤erently in the intra-alliance
contest than two strangers do in the same contest. In the FightNH treatment,
there are only two players A and B who play the lottery contest for a prize
of 450 and who had no former history of inter-alliance competition.
Table 1 gives an overview of the four treatments. Columns 2-5 describe
the characteristic features of these treatments and surveys the e¤ort levels
and expected payo¤s in the subgame perfect equilibrium for players who
maximize their material payo¤s.
The experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and
run in MELESSA, the Munich Experimental Laboratory for Economic and
Social Sciences, in 2010. Each experimental session involved 24 student-
subjects playing one out of the four treatments. The data was collected
11
Treatment Share Share900 Fight FightNH
Prize 450 900 450 450
Players AB,C AB,C AB,C A,B
Prize sharing 50, 50 50, 50 Contest Contest
(between A and B)
(xA + xB)

, xC (50, 100) (100, 200) (18, 72) 
y
A
, y
B
  (112.5, 112.5) (112.5, 112.5)
(EA+EB)
; (EC)

(100, 200) (200, 400) (27, 288) 
(EA)
; (EB)

   (112.5, 112.5)
Table 1: Treatment specications.
from three sessions each for treatment Share, Share900, and Fight, and one
session for treatment FightNH. Overall, 240 subjects participated in the ex-
periment. They were students from all elds of study.9 Each subject played
only one treatment and had a xed role in this treatment (either player A
or B, or player C). This role (as A, B or C) was randomly assigned by the
computer programme. The rules of the respective treatment were known to
all players. Subjects were randomly divided into subgroups of six subjects
in treatment Share, Share900, and Fight, and subgroups of four subjects in
FightNH. Each treatment consisted of 12 rounds, and subjects kept their
assigned roles throughout these rounds. However, subjects were randomly
rematched within their subgroup in each round (in order to avoid repeated
interaction behavior). Each subgroup can be used as a single independent
observation.10
Subjects were given written instructions at the beginning of each session
9The participants were recruited using the software ORSEE (Greiner 2004).
10Random matching within a small group does not completely rule out that individuals
are interacting with the same player in a future round. However, this random matching
ruled out that players know that they are, or will be rematched with the same player in
a particular round. Also the precise division of the subgroups was not explained to the
subjects in the experiment. They were told that they would be randomly rematched with
other players in each period and potentially they would play with and/or against di¤erent
people in di¤erent periods. We believe that this design is a good compromise to balance
the problem of repeated game e¤ects and the quest for su¢ cient independent observations.
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(see Appendix for a sample). To ensure that they properly understood the
instructions they had to answer a set of pre-experiment questions. The ex-
periment only started after the subjects had answered the testing questions.
At the end of the experiment, the subjects had to ll in a questionnaire. At
the end of their session, each subject was paid separately and in private. In
addition to a xed payment of 0:6 EURO that they received for each round,
the subjects were also paid a 4 EURO show-up fee, plus their prots in 3
rounds randomly drawn out of 12 rounds. On average, the subjects earned
14 EURO, and in total a session took about one hour.
4 Hypotheses and main results
The main questions that motivated our analysis are: (1) Does the nature of
the subgame in which alliance members solve the problem of distributing the
prize among themselves a¤ect their contributions to the total e¤ort of the
alliance? (2) Does the experience of having been brothers in armsin the
contest against an outsider change alliance membersghting if the division
of the prize among them follows the rules of a contest? In particular, does
a possible in-group solidarity e¤ect carry over to the contest between former
brothers in arms? These questions and the related theory considerations
translate into two main hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: In the contest between the alliance and the out-group
player, average e¤ort of alliance players is higher if the members of a vic-
torious alliance share the prize equally than if they ght about the prize among
themselves.
Note that this hypothesis follows straightforwardly from economic the-
ory (Katz and Tokadlidu 1996, Esteban and Sákovics 2003): future conict
about the prize reduces the value of winning this prize. This makes it less
attractive for the alliance group to win, and this should reduce their joint
e¤orts. Note also that this e¤ect should emerge whether the alliance mem-
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berscontributions are determined by non-cooperative behavior or by group-
spirited considerations. Hence, Hypothesis 1 is fully compatible with the idea
of out-group hostility and with an in-group solidarity e¤ect emphasized by
psychologists.
The second hypothesis concerns the role of a brothers in armsexperience
for the intensity of ghting between the members of a victorious alliance for
who eventually receives the prize. In order to see whether the former in-
group experience matters, we compare the e¤ort of former brothers in arms
with the e¤ort of complete strangers in a situation that otherwise is the same
lottery contest for the same prize value, controlling for selection e¤ects. We
formulate two mutually incompatible hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: Former brothers in arms expend the same e¤ort in the
internal conict as do players without a common history.
The competing hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 2b: Former brothers in arms expend less e¤ort in the in-
ternal conict than do players without a common history.
The anecdotal evidence of the break-ups of war alliances at the end of
war and the intensity of the Cold War suggests that data are in line with Hy-
pothesis 2a. The psychology of in-group solidarity suggests that Hypothesis
2b may hold.
Before turning to the assessment of these main hypotheses, it is reassuring
to note that the individuals in the experiment exhibit many characteristic
patterns that are known from other contest experiments.
First, it is well documented that individuals in lottery contests expend
more e¤ort than what would be desirable for individuals who maximize their
monetary payo¤s. Individuals in our experiment also show this pattern. This
is true, in particular, for treatment FightNH, which is a standard symmetric
lottery contest between two contestants. It also shows up in all other treat-
ments. Table 2 provides the dissipation rates (dened as e¤ort expenditure
compared to the monetary value of the prize) observed in the experiment,
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compared to their theoretical predictions for all treatments. In equal-sharing
treatments (Share and Share900 ), subjects overall dissipate more than 60%
of the prize value when the equilibrium prediction is only 0.33. In Fight treat-
ment, subjects should only expend 20% of the prize value in inter-alliance
contest, given that alliance players will face a second-stage contest if they
win. However, we still observe a dissipation rate of 66% for experienced be-
havior (rounds 7-12). In the second stage of the Fight treatment, the former
alliances expend similar e¤ort (76% of the full prize) as what is dissipated
in FightNH treatment. This higher-than-predicted e¤ort is a common phe-
nomenon in contests, and has been explained, e.g., by an intrinsic benet of
winning (Sheremeta 2010).
Average Rate of Dissipation (total e¤ort/prize)
Treatment stage Prediction Actual rate
period 1-12 period 7-12
Share 0.33 0.62 0.63
Share900 0.33 0.65 0.64
Fight stage 1 0.20 0.70 0.66
stage 2 0.50 0.69 0.76
FightNH 0.50 0.75 0.80
Table 2: Average dissipation rate by treatment.
Second, the treatment Share is fully congruent with one of the treatments
in Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport (2006) both in its structure and as regards
the empirical results. Alliance players and the outgroup player C overexpend
e¤orts compared to the narrow equilibrium predictions, and alliance players
can achieve higher joint e¤orts rather than the lower joint e¤orts that would
be predicted by the free-riding problem they face. Hence, when turning to the
more innovative treatments with intra-alliance ghting, there is some reason
to trust that our subject pool is not systematically di¤erent from subject
pools in other contest experiments.
Third, a comparison between the two Share treatments shows that players
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neatly respond to monetary payo¤s. Doubling the prize value actually leads
to roughly doubling the respective e¤orts. While players may follow other
objectives in addition, monetary payo¤s seemingly matter. Descriptively,
the similarity of the treatments Share and Share900 is illustrated in the left
panel of Figure 1.
Figure 1: Average e¤ort (alliance and single player) by treatment and period.
Hypothesis 1 Let us now turn to the rst main Hypothesis, starting with
a descriptive analysis. In the right panel of Figure 1 we plot the time series
average e¤ort in the treatment Fight and Share. The alliance players (A
and B) expend together about the same e¤ort in the Fight as in the Share
treatment. This does not support the hypothesis that if an internal ght is
followed by the victory of the alliance, alliance players should expend much
less in the inter-alliance contest. Single playersbehavior also does not di¤er
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for the two treatments, which is consistent with the invariance of alliance
playersjoint e¤ort across treatments.
A multilevel mixed-e¤ect model can test whether e¤ort choices di¤er
across treatments. The dependent variables are the e¤ort/prize ratio (1)
for the individual alliance player and (2) for the single player in each treat-
ment. Apart from treatment dummies, to control for learning e¤ects, we
include a time dummy into the estimation, indicating whether observations
are from the rst half of the experiment, and we interact this time dummy
with the treatment dummies. Moreover, we include both group-specic and
individual-specic error terms to control for group and individual heterogen-
eity. The equation we estimate is:
xijt = 0 + 1  Share900 + 2  Fight+ 3  t(1::6)
+4  Share900 t(1::6) + 5  Fight t(1::6) + i + ij + "ijt
The random e¤ects are estimated through a group-specic error term (i)
and an individual-specic error term (ij). The covariates we estimate in the
xed e¤ect are ve dummies: Share900, Fight, t(1..6), Share900t(1..6),
and Fightt(1..6). The constant measures average e¤ort in periods 7 12 in
the Share treatment, and Share900 and Fight estimate the respective treat-
ment e¤ect comparing data across treatments in the second half of the exper-
iment. Moreover, for the Share treatment, t(1..6) measures the di¤erence in
e¤orts between the rst and second half of the experiment; Share900t(1..6)
and Fightt(1..6) compare e¤ort in periods 1   6 and the respective treat-
ment to the base category (Share, periods 7  12).
Table 3 presents the results of both regressions. Alliance players (model 1)
each put in an e¤ort equivalent to around 16.4% of the prize value when they
jointly play against the single player. In the second half of the experiment
(i.e., periods 7-12), there is no signicant treatment e¤ect either for the
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Model (1) (2)
specication alliance players (A or B) only single players (C) only
Dependent Var. E¤ort
A
/Prize or E¤ort
B
/Prize E¤ort
C
/Prize
Constant 0.164*** 0.305***
(0.016) (0.025)
Share900 -0.012 0.031
(0.022) (0.035)
Fight -0.015 0.061*
(0.022) (0.035)
t(1..6) -0.004 -0.017
(0.008) (0.013)
Share900t(1..6) 0.016 0.018
(0.022) (0.035)
Fightt(1..6) 0.028 0.071**
(0.022) (0.035)
Random-e¤ect:
Level-1 (group) 0.036 0.021
(0.009) (0.053)
Level-2 (subject) 0.072 0.109
(0.006) (0.014)
Residual: 0.091 0.112
(0.002) (0.003)
Total observations 1728 864
Log likelihood: 1520.255 573.223
Wald 2(5) 37.44*** 10.95 *
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * signicant at 10%, ** signicant at 5%, *** signicant
at 1%. Observations in Share treatment from period 7-12 are taken as the baseline group.
Table 3: Multi-level random e¤ect models on e¤orts in the rst stage.
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Share900 or for the Fight treatment; this also holds for the rst half of the
experiment. The single players (as shown in model 2) expend roughly twice
the e¤ort of each alliance player (i.e., 30.5% of the prize value). This leaves
the alliance and the single player almost an equal ex post chance of winning
the prize. Single players initially expend slightly higher e¤ort (7% more) in
the Fight treatment than in the other treatments, this di¤erence, however,
is only weakly signicant in the second half of the experiment. There exists
quite some heterogeneity (on the group and individual levels) both among
alliance players and among single players, as in both regressions more than
50% of the error term is due to i and ij.
11 In summary, we nd that,
contrary to the theory, alliance players jointly put in an e¤ort similar to
that of the single player, rather than much less e¤ort. Moreover, the hold-
up problem caused by future internal distributional conict is seemingly not
very severe, and thus we do not nd support for Hypothesis 1.
In the light of Hypothesis 1, this is a strong and surprising result. Our
analysis becomes exploratory when mentioning some possible reasons. First,
players may derive some additional pleasure or satisfaction from winning, in
addition to the actual monetary value of the prize (Sheremeta 2010). This en-
larges their subjective valuation of winning. Second, in the Fight treatment,
the repeated interaction between A and B within one round may generate
incentives for players to use their e¤ort contribution in the contest against
C to signal their high desire for winningby making high e¤ort contribu-
tions, trying to discourage their co-player in the alliance in the subsequent
intra-alliance contest.12 This is particularly relevant if there is a consider-
able heterogeneity among players about this desire for winning. A further
explanation may also be related to non-monetary motivations, but is much
simpler. Subjects may simply enjoy playing the lottery contest. Hence, if
11Tests on the estimation of i and ij are both signicantly di¤erent from zero. This
further justies our choice of the multilevel mixed-e¤ects model.
12Repeated contests with incomplete information have been studied by Münster (2009),
showing that the signaling problem is non-trivial.
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Question:
In the competition with player C, have you tried
to expend less e¤ort than your co-player within
the alliance in order to benet from his e¤ort?
Agree Dont agree Dont know
Share 31.25% 62.5% 6.25%
Share900 33.33% 66.67% 0%
Fight 47.92% 37.5% 14.58%
Table 4: Question on behavior in the inter-alliance conict.
they can a¤ect the probability for reaching stages in which they can play
additional lottery contests (i.e., reach the subgame with the intra-group con-
test), then they may be willing to expend extra e¤ort trying to reach these
stages.
Besides these possible reasons that might have caused high e¤ort in the
Fight treatment, there remains an additional factor that actually should have
worked in favor of Hypothesis 1: one could have expected free-riding behavior
among alliance members to be stronger when they know that they will have
to ght internally about the prize. This motive is indeed present in our
experiment. We can conrm this by using the questionnaire that subjects
had to ll in at the end of the experiment. There we asked, among many
other questions, whether alliance players tried to free-ride on their co-players
e¤orts (see Table 4). While in the treatments with peaceful sharing of the
price about 32% answered in favor of free-riding, this fraction increased to
48% in the Fight treatment.13
13This di¤erence is statistically signicant. Moreover, including a variable containing
this answer into the estimated equation on alliance players e¤ort shows that subjects
having answered in favor of free-riding put signicantly less e¤ort in the inter-alliance
conict. This conrms that the subjectsanswers are consistent with their behavior in the
experiment.
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Hypotheses 2a and 2b We now turn to the internal ght between former
brothers in arms and examine whether alliance players ght more or less
ercely against each other than strangers without a common history. We
compare the e¤ort choice in the second stage in the Fight treatment to the
e¤ort choices in the simple two-player Tullock contest (the FightNH treat-
ment).
Figure 2: Average e¤ort in two-players contest (Fight vs. Fight_NH ).
Figure 2 presents average e¤ort choices per period in both treatments.
The two time series of average e¤ort walk exactly shoulder-to-shoulder. At
least, in aggregate levels we do not observe any di¤erence between two al-
liance players and two total strangers. This is further conrmed by our
regression results. Using the same multilevel mixed-e¤ect model, we com-
pare individual e¤ort in the internal ght of Fight to e¤ort in FightNH. As
baseline category, we use e¤ort in FightNH and periods 7-12, and we allow
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e¤ort to change with three dummies: Fight, t(1..6), Fightt(1..6). Following
the same logic as above, the dummy Fight measures the brothers-in-arms
treatment e¤ect in the second half, and the time dummy t(1..6) as well as its
interaction with the treatment dummy control for learning e¤ects. As shown
in Table 5 (model 1), there is no signicant treatment e¤ect either. Subjects
in both treatments tend to compete more aggressively in the second half of
the experiment and expend on average 25 points more in period 7 to 12.
This result suggests that a common ghting history seemingly plays no
major role for the subsequent intra-alliance contest. An actual di¤erence may,
however, be hidden in the data. The two treatments Fight and FightNH
possibly di¤er along other important dimensions, and the e¤ects of these
other dimensions may just cancel with the history e¤ect which one may have
expected to nd. One such e¤ect is a possible selection bias in the intra-
alliance contests. Players in the winning alliance may generally expend more
e¤ort than the average players. Their higher e¤ort may be an indication
of a higher intrinsic motivation for winning, which should carry over to the
second stage and induce higher e¤ort there, too. This selection e¤ect may
counteract the e¤ect that former brothers in arms would be nicer to each
other than strangers are. A second possible e¤ect is the so-called sunk-cost
fallacy. If the subjects do not perceive the cost of their e¤ort in inter-
alliance contests as being sunk already, members in the winning alliance may
want to try to put more e¤ort in hoping that the winning of the grand nale
could recover all their current and previous cost. Therefore they expend more
e¤ort than they should even if they have already been nicer to their former
partners.
Figure 3 illustrates the relationship of alliance playersstage 1 and stage
2 e¤ort in the Fight treatment. The horizontal axis shows average e¤ort
(in periods 7   12) that a subject who was an alliance player expended in
the competition with the out-group player, and the vertical axis plots this
subjects average e¤ort (in periods 7   12) in the internal ght, provided
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Dependent Var. E¤ort yA or yB
Model (1) (2) (3)
Constant 180.396*** 180.396*** 180.396***
(14.763) (14.627) (14.658)
Fight -7.907 -6.676 -5.422
(18.558) (18.431) (18.518)
t(1..6) -25.132*** -25.132*** -25.132***
(5.944) (5.890) (5.824)
Fightt(1..6) 1.578 -3.248 -8.769
(8.844) (9.006) (9.115)
(xit xalliancet )Fight 0.0236 0.040
(0.090) 0.090
(xit xalliancet )Fightt(1..6) 0.212** 0.230**
(0.104) 0.103
(x it xalliancet )Fight -0.056
(0.081)
(x it xalliancet )Fightt(1..6) 0.299***
(0 .104 )
Random-e¤ect:
Level-1 (group): 29.335 28.762 28.910
(7.718) (7.751) (7.751 )
Level-2 (subject): 36.937 37.543 37.508
(4.625) (4.657) (4.664)
Residual: 50.434 49.982 49.416
(1.635) (1.620) (1.604)
Total observations 546 546 546
Log likelihood: -2980.182 -2976.303 -2970.748
Wald() 31.04*** 39.44*** 51.55***
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * signicant at 10%, ** signicant at 5%,
*** signicant at 1%. Observations in period 7-12 are taken as the baseline group.
Table 5: Multi-level random e¤ect models on two-player contests.
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that this stage is reached. Thus, subjects expending the same e¤ort in both
competitions would be located on the 45-degree-line. Most of the subjects
chose higher e¤ort in the second stage than in the rst stage, which is in line
with the theory prediction. A very high fraction of subjects chose the highest
possible e¤ort in the internal ght, which is clearly in contradiction to any
e¤ect of joint history of ghting. Only very few subjects chose much lower
e¤ort in the second stage competition than in the rst stage; this behavior
could reect a brothers in armse¤ect.
Figure 3: Comparison of stage 1 and stage 2 e¤orts in the Fight treatment.
In order to capture the e¤ect of stage 1 e¤ort in the Fight treatment, we
include two further variables into the estimation. First, xit xalliancet measures
player is relative type by calculating the di¤erence between his e¤ort and
the average e¤ort of alliance players in period t. Second, x it   xalliancet
computes a similar measure for player is co-player within the alliance in
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period t. In model 2 in Table 5, we include only xit  xalliancet interacted with
the dummies Fight and Fightt(1..6) into the estimation, while in model 3
we include both xit   xalliancet and x it   xalliancet , again as interaction terms.
The e¤ects of a players and his co-players relative type turn out to be
signicantly positive, but only in the rst half of the rounds of the experiment
(periods 1   6). Here, players who chose more e¤ort than average in stage
1 also choose higher e¤ort in the distributional conict in stage 2. This
means that contestants who compete harder in the rst stage tend to also
compete harder in the second stage. This could be explained both by a sunk-
cost fallacy and by a selection bias (more aggressive types put more e¤ort
in both stages). Further, subjects who played against a more aggressive
player in stage 1 choose higher e¤ort in stage 2. This implies that subjects
did not moderate their ghting e¤ort vis-à-vis their fellow ghters who have
helped them to win the rst contest by being aggressive in the inter-alliance
contest. On the contrary, they seem to infer from the higher stage 1 e¤ort
of their partners that higher e¤ort is also more likely in the intra-alliance
contest, and hence expend more e¤ort as well. In these three models, the
estimated treatment e¤ect (Fight) is negative; the standard errors, however,
are fairly high and the estimates are not statistically signicant. Thus, we
nd evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2a, and we do not nd a signicant
e¤ect of joint history as stated in Hypothesis 2b, even after controlling for
the selection bias, or the intrinsic joy of winning.
The variance of individual behavior is quite high in the Fight treatment.
Thus it may be di¢ cult to identify a signicant e¤ect of joint history as
brothers in arms from limited observations. Looking at the questionnaire
that we conducted at the end of the experiment, we do nd an e¤ect of joint
history. Asking the students for their goal in the two-player competition
(the competition with player C in the Fight treatment and the stage-game
competition in the FightNH treatment) we obtained the answers summarized
in Table 6. In the Fight treatment, 65% of the subjects agreed that it was
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Question:
[When you won the competition against player C,]
what was your goal in the [following] competition?
Answer:
1: "In any case try to
win myself."
2: "Keep e¤orts low such
that I and my co-player
have higher payo¤s."
Agree or not? Yes No Dont know Yes No Dont know
Fight 64.58% 31.25% 4.17% 37.50% 52.08% 10.42%
FightNH 75.0% 20.83% 4.17% 16.67% 54.17% 29.17%
Table 6: Question on behavior in stage 2 of Fight and the contest of FightNH.
important for them to win on their own; in the FightNH treatment, this
number increased to 75%. Similarly, in the Fight treatment 37:5% of the
subjects agreed to the statement that they tried to cooperate with their
co-player by choosing low e¤ort; in the FightNH treatment, this attempt
to cooperate was conrmed by only 16:7% of the subjects.14 Including the
subjectsanswers to these two questions into the estimation shows that these
di¤erent motives signicantly explain the choice of e¤ort in the internal ght.
5 Conclusion
We analyzed the strategic interaction within alliances. Our rst result con-
siders free-riding among members of the alliance who jointly ght against an
outside enemy. Free-riding is far less pronounced than what would be ex-
pected from non-cooperative narrowly selsh behavior among the members
of alliances. Even in the absence of repeated interaction, and in the absence
of direct contact, communication or other means of exchange among alli-
14Answers to these two questions are highly negatively correlated. Agreement to the
second question (on cooperation) di¤ers signicantly across the two treatments for the
question, while the di¤erence for the question of whether subjects have tried to win on
their own is not statistically signicant.
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ance members, they expend very similar e¤ort as unitary players who do not
have a similar free-riding problem. This conrms previous results on ghting
e¤orts of alliances.
Second, when ghting an outside enemy, brothers in armsmay already
anticipate that success in the external conict will be followed subsequently
by future internal conict about dividing the spoils of victory. Economic
reasoning suggests that the subsequent conict about dividing up the spoils
should discourage alliance members from expending much e¤ort in the con-
test against the external enemy. We show that this future ghting does not
prevent alliance members from ghting shoulder-to-shoulder. More form-
ally, allies in a contest against an outside enemy expend, on average, the same
amount of contest e¤ort, irrespective of whether they have to share any spoils
from conict peacefully, or whether they can ght about the distribution of
these spoils among themselves.
Third, former members of the same alliance ght vigorously against each
other when dividing the spoils of victory. Comparing their e¤orts in this
internal ght with the e¤orts expended by players in the same distributional
conict who do not have a common history as brothers in arms, we nd
very similar levels of e¤ort and, in any case, no signicant di¤erences. This
may suggest that possible solidarity among brothers in armswhen ghting
against an outside enemy may rapidly depreciate or disappear as soon as
the outside enemy disappears. The results are in line both with economic
reasoning, and with the anecdotal evidence on the break-up of alliances at
the end of the conict with an external enemy discussed in the introduction.
Comparing average e¤ort per subject in the inter-alliance contest to this
subjects e¤ort in the intra-alliance conict, however, suggests that there are
several di¤erent motives driving individual behavior.
Overall, due to these properties, the collaboration in alliances is reason-
ably good, leading to higher success against lone enemies than one might
predict. However, this success cannot obscure the fact that the material
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payo¤ of alliance members is low, compared to that of lone players.
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A Experimental Instructions (a sample for
the Fight treatment)
Welcome to this experiment! Please read these instructions carefully and
completely. Properly understanding the instruction will help you to make
better decisions and hence earn more money.
Your earnings in this experiment will be measured in Talers. At the end
of the experiment we will convert the Talers you have earned to cash and
pay you in private. For each 45 Talers you earn you will be paid 1 Euro
in cash. Therefore, the more Talers you earn, the more cash you will gain at
the end of todays experiment. In addition to the Talers earned during the
experiment, each participant will receive a show-up fee of 4 Euros.
Please keep in mind that you are not allowed to communicate with other
participants during the experiment. If you do not obey this rule you will be
asked to leave the laboratory without getting paid. Whenever you have a
question, please raise your hand; an experimenter will come to you.
A.1 Your task
This experiment will consist of 12 rounds. Before the actual experiment
starts, you will rst have to answer a few questions related to the experiment.
The questions will be presented to you through the computer screen. For the
experiment, groups consisting of three people are formed. These groups are
randomly composed in each round. Your task in each round is to make some
decisions. The money you earn depends on your decision and the decisions
of the two other players in your group.
Let the three players in one group be called A, B and C. In each round,
three players A, B and C compete for a prize of 450 Talers. The competition
works as follows:
1. Two players A and B form an alliance. Player C is playing on his
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own.
2. Your role in the experiment will be either that of player A, B or C.
This role will be randomly assigned to you. Each participant will keep
his role throughout the entire experiment.
3. In a rst stage, all players will simultaneously choose an e¤ort level.
Each player decides independently on his own e¤ort level. A players
e¤ort is chosen as an integer between 0 and 250, and it corresponds to
the amount of Talers the player would like to expend in the competition
to win the prize. You will have to pay this amount of Talers to the
lab, whether or not you win the competition. In the following, player
As e¤ort is denoted by XA, player Bs e¤ort is denoted by XB, and
similarly player Cs e¤ort is denoted by XC .
4. Then, you will be shown the amount of Talers that the other players
in your group have expended. The e¤orts of player A and B will be
added up and the sum of XA and XB corresponds to the e¤ort that
the alliance of players A and B spends on the competition. The total
expense is equal to the sum of all playerse¤orts: XA +XB +XC .
5. Now a fortune wheel will turn and decide whether the alliance consist-
ing of A and B or whether player C wins the 450-Taler-prize. As you
will see, the fortune wheel is divided into two colors - red and blue.
The red color represents the total Talers spent by player A and B (i.e.,
XA+XB). The blue color represents the Talers spent by player C (i.e.,
XC ). The two colored areas on the wheel represent exactly their shares
in the total expense (i.e., XA +XB +XC).
6. At the centre of the fortune wheel there is an arrow initially pointing
to the top. After some time the arrow starts to rotate and then stops
randomly. If the arrow stops in the red-colored area, players A and
B win the prize. If the arrow stops in the blue-colored area, player C
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wins the prize. This means that the probability that players A and B
win the prize is equal to their share of their joint e¤ort in the total
expense, hence
probability that A and B win =
e¤ort XA + e¤ort XB
total expense XA +XB +XC
:
Equivalently, the probability that player C wins the prize is equal to
the share of Cs e¤ort in the total expense:
probability that C wins =
e¤ort XC
total expense XA +XB +XC
:
For your information, the probabilities that either the alliance of A and
B or player C wins the competition will be displayed to you.
Therefore, each players probability of winning depends not only on
his own expenditure in the competition but also on the expenditures
of the other players in the group. Note that the more Talers a player
spends, the more likely it is that he wins the competition. More e¤ort
expended, however, means that a player has to pay more Talers to the
lab.
7. If none of the players expends any Taler, i.e., XA = XB = XC = 0 ,
then it is equally likely that either the alliance A and B or player C
wins. If players A and B both do not expend any Taler, but player C
expends at least one Taler, player C wins the competition. If player C
does not expend any Taler, but either player A or player B (or both)
expends at least one Taler, the alliance A and B wins the competition.
8. Every player has to pay his e¤ort (in Taler) to the lab, irrespectively of
the outcome of the fortune wheel. Therefore, your earnings per round
will be calculated as your gain in the competition minus your e¤ort:
earnings=gain-e¤ort.
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 In case player C wins, the competition ends and he gets the 450-
Taler-prize; players A and B will gain nothing. While players A
and B do not have any gain, but have to pay their e¤orts, the
earnings of player C are calculated as follows: Cs earnings = 450
XC .
 In case the alliance of A and B wins the competition, then players
A and B again have to compete with each other for the prize of
450 Taler. The procedure of this competition is exactly the same
as described above when the alliance players A, B compete against
player C for the prize. At rst A and B have to decide simultan-
eously and independently about the amount of Talers they would
like to expend to win the prize of 450 Taler. The e¤ort again is
chosen as an integer between 0 and 250, and it has to be paid
to the lab in addition to the e¤orts already paid (XA and XB),
whether or not the player wins the competition.
In the following these new e¤orts of A and B are denoted by YA
and YB. (Note that these e¤orts are only chosen if the alliance of
A and B has won against player C.) Again a fortune wheel will
determine the winner. The probability that A wins the prize of
450 Taler will be:
Probability that A wins =
e¤ort YA
total expense YA + YB
Equivalently, the probability that player B wins, will be:
Probability that B wins =
e¤ort YB
total expense YA + YB
Therefore, each players probability of winning now depends only
on the e¤orts in this new competition. The yellow-colored area on
the lottery wheel will denote the share of As e¤ort in total expense
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YA + YB; the green-colored area denotes the share of Bs e¤ort in
total expense. Again the arrow will rotate to decide whether A or
B wins the prize.
Hence, in case that players A and B won the competition against
player C before, the earnings of players A and B are calculated as
follows:
 In the case that A wins against B, B has to pay both his
e¤ortsXB and YB, and does not receive any gain. As earnings
in this case will be: As earnings = 450 XA   YA.
 In the case that A loses against B, player A has to pay both
his e¤orts XA and YA, and does not receive any gain. Bs
earnings will be: Bs earnings = 450 XB   YB.
 In both cases player C receives no gain but has to pay his
e¤ort XC expended in the rst competition.
A.2 Procedure
The experiment will consist of 12 identical rounds. In each round, you will
have the same role (player A, B or C). The other two players in your group
will be randomly assigned to you in each round.
You will not know who the other players in your group are. All the
decisions you make will remain anonymous, and any attempt to reveal your
identity to anyone is prohibited. After the experiment, you will be asked to
answer some questions, including some personal information (e.g., gender,
age, major...). All the information you provide will be kept anonymous and
strictly condential.
At the end of todays experiment, we will randomly choose 3 rounds
out of 12 to pay you. Your total earnings in those 3 rounds will be added
up, converted to euros and paid to you in cash. This means that the earnings
of all other rounds will not be paid to you and that you do not have to pay
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the e¤orts of these rounds either. You will get to know which 3 out of the
12 rounds will be chosen only after nishing these 12 rounds.
Additionally to your earnings in these 3 selected rounds, you will receive
0.60 euros for each of the 12 rounds you have played .
Before the experiment starts, we will ask you some questions (which are
related to the actions in the experiment) through the computer screen.
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